Overview and Statement of Significance

The Battle of Pinkie is significant as probably the single largest battle fought within Scotland and for the use on a British battlefield of some of the major military innovations of the 16th century. It is also the final major battle fought between the separate Kingdoms of Scotland and England prior to the Union of the Crowns in 1603. It also leads directly to Mary, Queen of Scots flight to France and the subsequent turmoil within Scotland after Mary's later return.

The Battle of Pinkie came as the culmination of Henry VIII's campaign, known as the Rough Wooing, with the objective of forcing the Scots acceptance of a marriage alliance between his son Edward and the infant Mary, Queen of Scots. After Henry's death in January 1547 the Regent, the Duke of Somerset, decided that an invasion was the only way to secure the marriage. In September 1547 he marched his army north along the east coast to Scotland.

The battle was a dramatic defeat for the Scots, causing the virtual destruction of their army. Despite Scotland's heavy losses, the English were unable to achieve their war aims; the marriage did not take place and this led to Mary's swift departure for France and her marriage to the Dauphin, thereby renewing the Auld Alliance.

Inventory Boundary

The Inventory boundary defines the area in which the main events of the battle are considered to have taken place (landscape context) and where associated physical remains and archaeological evidence occur or may be expected (specific qualities). The landscape context is described under battlefield landscape: it encompasses areas of fighting, key movements of troops across the landscape and other important locations, such as the positions of camps or vantage points. Although the landscape has changed since the time of the battle, key characteristics of the terrain at the time of the battle can normally still be identified, enabling events to be more fully understood and interpreted in their landscape context. Specific qualities are described under physical remains and potential: these include landscape features that played a significant role in the battle, other physical remains, such as enclosures or built structures, and areas of known or potential archaeological evidence.

The Inventory boundary for the Battle of Pinkie is defined on the accompanying map and includes the following areas:

• Land to the west of Esk, now housing estates on the south-west of Musselburgh (Whitehill, Stoneyhill, Stoneybank and Eskview). The probable location of the Scottish camp.
• The area around Drummohr and Morrison's Haven. The location of the English camp before the battle.
• The slopes and summit of Carberry Hill. The probable location of the cavalry skirmish the day before the battle.
• The River Esk from Musselburgh to Whitecraig and lands to the east including the old bridge, Inveresk, the Carberry Road (A6124), Wallyford and Howe Mire. The location of the advance of the Scottish troops over the Esk and eastward.
• The position of the English troop's deployment on the slopes of Falside Hill.
• Landscape features involved in the rout and the aftermath of the battle, notably the route westward of the rout over the old bridge in Musselburgh, St Michael's churchyard where some of the victims of the rout were buried and Falside castle, which was burnt after the battle by the English.
• The well preserved landscape characteristics of the battlefield including the views out and relationship between the lower slopes of Falside Hill, the Howe Mire, lands to the west of the Esk and Inveresk Churchyard.

The Scottish army of 22-23,000 men under the Earl of Arran was camped at Musselburgh, controlling the bridge across the Esk and protected by the steep river bank and an area of marshland to the south. The English army of 15-19,000 men under the Duke of Somerset had advanced up the east coast, keeping close to the coast to maintain contact with the navy. On the night before the battle, the English camped just to the west of Prestonpans.

The initial fighting began on 9 September with a confrontation between cavalry units at Falside Hill, where the Scottish cavalry were heavily mauled and driven west for three miles. As a result, a large part of the Scottish cavalry was not available to Arran the following day when the main battle took place. In the meantime, having gained the high ground above Musselburgh, Somerset established artillery on the slopes.

On the morning of 10 September, the English moved towards Inveresk Church (St Michael's) but discovered that the Scots had broken camp and were already taking control of the church. This meant that the Scots had abandoned a strong defensive position and were now exposed. Indeed, the Scots now continued to advance rapidly, moving faster than the English expected. There are divergent opinions on why the Scots were advancing; it may have been to try to take the high ground, while it has also been suggested that it was an attempt to avoid the threat of artillery on the slopes by coming to close combat before the guns could be brought into use. Whatever the case, Somerset sent in his cavalry to slow down the advance. The Scottish schiltrons worked effectively against the English cavalry and drove them off with what were described as heavy losses. However, the momentum of the Scottish advance had been lost, and they were now static and in open ground. They were within range of the artillery on the slopes and of the naval guns; the ships had already inflicted casualties on Arran's rearguard as they had advanced through Musselburgh. The Highland archers in the rearguard had sustained losses from the naval bombardment and some had broken and run as a result.

Nevertheless, the Scottish position still seemed reasonably strong. There was a head-dyke in front of the Earl of Angus's troops, with Angus the commander of the Scottish vanguard, protecting against cavalry charges, while the remaining Scots army had a turf wall on the right flank and possibly the Pinkie Burn on the left, both of which guarded against flanking movements by cavalry. However, they were now facing archers, arquebusiers and artillery; they were also in view of the English ships and in range of their guns. While the Scots had the same types of ordnance, they had far fewer and were unable to respond in kind to the fire that now poured in on them from front and rear. The Scots could not stay where they were under such intense bombardment, and there seems to have been an attempt to pull back and move out of range. At this point, the Scottish discipline that had held so well against the cavalry began to deteriorate and the retreat quickly collapsed into a rout. As the Scottish schiltrons collapsed and men dropped their equipment to run for Musselburgh and Edinburgh, the English cavalry came back into the fray and cut men down for an extended distance. Some sources claim that the pursuit was all the way to the walls of Edinburgh, but even more conservative accounts suggest a very extensive killing zone towards the city.

As a final part of the fighting, the small Scottish garrison that had held out in Falside Castle was all killed when the English set the tower on fire. As the time was now well into the afternoon, the English made camp a little to the east of Inveresk Church; the next morning they collected Scottish artillery and equipment and buried their dead.

The Armies

The armies which fought at Pinkie included highly experienced troops from across Europe employing, in part at least, weapons and tactics at the leading edge of European military practice. The English infantry tactics involved deployment in three divisions or 'battles': the vanguard, main battle and the rearguard. Each normally represented a potentially independent fighting force, comprising pike or billmen supported on the wings by archers and/or hagbutters. These forces would then normally be supported on the wings by heavy or light cavalry. The cavalry were armed with lance and sword, but there was also a small body of horse equipped with hagbuts. The English artillery train comprised 15 great pieces and more of smaller bore, while the whole army had both logistical and tactical support from the navy.

The Scots were predominantly infantry equipped with pikes, supported by a few thousand Highland archers but with few troops carrying firearms. Some troops were carrying makeshift wooden shields to defend against the light artillery or handguns. They comprised both local levies and the retinue of the nobility. The Scottish horse was relatively few in number, all light cavalry, thus effective for scouting and skirmishing but unsuited to meet the English heavy cavalry in close formation. The Scottish force also had a substantial artillery train. Whereas the men-at-arms in the English army were heavily armoured, the common soldiers of both armies are likely to have been similarly equipped: with jacks and salets or other head protection, and armed with swords, in addition to their main arm of pike, bill, bow or hagbutt.

Numbers

Of the primary sources, Patten gives the most detailed breakdown of the English forces. In the secondary works, the most useful discussions are in Jordan and in Caldwell (Caldwell 1991; Jordan 1968). The numbers for the English are fairly secure, those for the Scots somewhat less so.

English: 15 - 19,000 in total, comprising 2,000 light horse; 3,000 mounted men-at-arms; 200 Spanish mounted 'hagbutters'; 11,000 English foot soldiers; 600 mercenary 'hagbutters'; 1,400 pioneers; 15 large artillery field pieces plus other lesser pieces.

Scots: Probably circa 22 - 23,000, comprising around 1,500 light horse; c 20,000 infantry, including 4000 highland archers; 25 - 30 artillery field pieces.

Losses

The losses are as ever not entirely clear, with claims of up to 15,000 Scots killed. However, this is around 75% fatalities, which is difficult to believe. It seems clear that the losses were very high and that a large number of Scots were killed. The English figures have also been exaggerated, but in the opposite direction. The English official losses were 250, but it is more likely to have been double that with the heavy losses suffered by the cavalry.

Action

The Scottish camp was established on the west side of the Esk, controlling the bridge by which the coast road to Edinburgh crossed the river, immediately west of Musselburgh. A turf defence wall with artillery protected one side of the camp, while the bridge over the Esk was also defended with artillery. The right, southern flank of the camp was protected by marshland, while the river itself lay to the east, its steep banks providing protection from English attack, even though the stream itself was shallow.

Somerset was aware of the Scottish position and on the night of 9 September, the English approached to within little more than two miles, camping to the west of Prestonpans. Scottish light cavalry had shadowed and probed from the hills in the preceding days. A detachment of English cavalry were finally sent to dislodge them from Falside Hill, which overlooked the coastal plain at Musselburgh. They drove off the Scottish cavalry, who were pursued for some 3 miles. In this action, while the English losses were about 100, the Scots lost up to 800 killed or taken, which was over half of the available cavalry. This gave English control of this commanding hill; Falside Castle lay on the SW slope, but was a weak fortification with a tiny Scottish garrison, and posed little threat to the English.

In the early morning of 10 September, the English army advanced towards Inveresk church, but the Scots had already crossed the river and advanced almost to the church before the English forces were half way there. Angus, the Scottish vanguard commander, is said to have disputed the order for this advance. Virtually since the day of the battle, there has been a debate about why Arran chose to abandon his strong, defensive position beyond the Esk, meeting the English at a disadvantage in open battle. He may have believed the English were retreating, or he may have intended to attack the English army while it still lay in its camp. It is also possible that the position was vulnerable to bombardment from the English guns on the ships in the Forth.

The Scottish vanguard, having forded the river, waited to the west of Inveresk church for the main battle to catch up. While the main battle passed immediately south of the church, the rearguard marched across the bridge and, part at least, through Musselburgh town before swinging south, a distance of up to 2 miles. Marching so close to the coast, the rearguard suffered from an artillery bombardment by at least one galley in the English fleet, which killed some Highland archers on the left flank, causing some to break and run early and forcing the rearguard southward.

The English believed the Scots, who marched at a rapid pace, were now making towards Falside Hill, to gain the advantage of the ground and the wind, and so they also turned their march and, as they did, were engaged by the Scottish artillery. The three English battles advanced in line of march, with archers on the left and hagbutters on the right of each battle. The English baggage train moved on the left flank, screened from the Scots, and was then taken up to the safety of Falside Hill. Two or three pieces of English ordnance were also placed near the hilltop and began firing on the Scots over the heads of the English troops. Once deployed, the English battle plan was to reform the cavalry on the wings to make flanking attacks to envelop the Scots as they faced to the fore to engage the infantry.

The Scottish army unexpectedly halted, perhaps because they realised they would not gain the hill, then advanced once more. To delay the enemy sufficiently to enable their infantry to gain the hill, an English cavalry attack was launched when the vanguards of the two armies were less than 500 m apart. The Scottish vanguard had halted in the fallow field of Inveresk, with a 'slough' less than c.50 m before them, and in this many English horse became mired. Beyond this, the ground was in ridge and furrow across the line of the cavalry attack, thus further disrupting their charge. The Scottish formations were deployed in schiltrons, creating an impenetrable 'hedgehog' of pikes. Though the left of the Scottish vanguard was pushed back by the cavalry charge, the battle array remained intact. In contrast, the losses amongst the English cavalry were substantial. The second line of cavalry wheeled about and retreated to the hill, some breaking away and riding through their own infantry vanguard, which was kept together only with difficulty. The way in which the pike held this cavalry attack belies the claim in some works that the Scottish pike were poorly trained and inexperienced.

This cavalry attack had given the English infantry time to reach the hillside and to deploy. The vanguard was placed on the lower slopes of the hill beside a square turf walled enclosure, which disrupted the even deployment of the troops on the left. The main battle was partly on the slope and part on the plain, while the rearguard was wholly on the plain. On the right flank, towards the enemy, were the hagbutters while the archers were on the other flank, towards the hill. The troops now only had to turn to the right to face the enemy and draw forward the hagbutters and archers to engage them.

The Scottish vanguard was to the fore, under Angus, with four or five pieces of ordnance on their right and 400 horse to their left. Behind and slightly westward were the main battle, and then the rearguard slightly back from them on their left, with the highland archers and pieces of ordnance flanking both bodies. Most interpretations of the battle imply an ineffective Scottish deployment but close examination of the way in which they deployed to meet the English attack suggests excellent exploitation of the tactical potential of the terrain. Not only had the vanguard stood with boggy ground to the fore, so disrupting a cavalry charge, but they had deployed with a double turf wall on their right flank, possibly also with the Pinkie Burn on their left flank, giving some protection from flanking cavalry attack. To a degree, this advantage was lost when some Scots rushed forward to dispatch cavalry that had been unable to retire after the first attack, thus rendering the vanguard somewhat disordered and vulnerable.

Meanwhile, a detachment of Scottish cavalry made an unsuccessful attack on the English artillery on the hill. In the main action the hagbutters were now thrown forward in a skirmish line at the edge of the 'slough', to engage the Scots prior to a general advance. Firing directly into the face of the enemy, they were reinforced by archers to their rear, firing over them into the enemy deployment, and by the artillery firing roundshot from the wings and from the hill behind. Patten's contemporary account describes the English in an arc that appears more characteristic of late Medieval battle formations based on archery than of the new era of pike and shot.

Under this intense fire, and seeing the whole English army, both horse and foot, deployed for the advance, the Scottish vanguard began to pull back. It is suggested that this may have been an attempt by the vanguard to retreat out of range of the artillery, or perhaps to pull back to the main battle before the two sides came to hand-to-hand fighting. If so, this proved a difficult manoeuvre, and withdrawal soon degenerated into flight. However, it may simply have been disintegration in the face of overwhelming firepower, to which the Scots had little answer. Though a few troops may have retained their battle array and made a fighting retreat, the majority dropped their pikes, jacks, salets and other equipment where they stood and fled back across the Esk. Some headed south-west towards Dalkeith, protected somewhat from cavalry pursuit by the marshes; others along the coast towards Leith, and many directly towards Edinburgh. The English cavalry now followed in pursuit, cutting down thousands as they ran. The bodies were scattered in a zone nearly 4 miles wide and in length almost to the gates of Edinburgh. The rout continued from about 1 pm until after 5 pm, when the retreat was finally called. Meanwhile, on Falside Hill the small garrison of Falside Castle, which had kept up fire against the English on the hill, were all killed as the tower was fired by the besiegers.

That night the English army camped at Edgebuklyng Bray, beside Pynkersclough just to the east of Inveresk church, about a mile from the camp of the night before. In the morning, they collected the abandoned Scottish artillery and equipment and buried the English dead, leaving the Scots to be buried by their countrymen. On 18 September, when Patten returned to the battlefield as the English army withdrew from Scotland, there were still some corpses unburied, though he reported that many had been interred in Inveresk churchyard. It is reported to have taken two days to find enough carts to collect up the Scottish dead for burial, while a month after the action there were still some bodies not yet buried (Treasurer's Accounts, ix; 121; 129).

Aftermath & Consequences

Pinkie was the last great battle between the two kingdoms before they were united under the rule of a single monarch. It was a Scottish defeat but, instead of leading to English domination of the military and political situation, it resulted in a strengthening of the Franco-Scottish alliance. Somerset failed to capitalise immediately upon the destruction of the Scottish army, and failed to reduce the key Scottish garrisons or to establish the major forts that he needed to secure the border territories. On the contrary, the defeat led to Mary's departure for France and her marriage to the Dauphin to secure the French Alliance, which resulted, in the summer of the following year, in the arrival of a French army in Scotland. That, combined with the pressure of a French assault on Boulogne, led the English to finally withdraw and to settle in a treaty of 1550. Thus the battle had long term political significance, but this was contrary to the successes on the field.

This is likely to have been one of the largest battles fought on Scottish soil, with at least 40,000 troops involved. It is also particularly noteworthy in representing the first effective integrated application in Britain of the key military innovations of the 16th century: the combined used of pike and shot, together with artillery and cavalry. Battlefields of this crucial transitional period in military practice are very rare in Britain.

There had been a long history of English claims to suzerainty over Scotland before Edward I had taken feudal overlordship over the kingdom. Henry VIII considered that he still retained that claim. He also considered Scotland an active threat due to its links with France at a time when England was involved in constant conflict with the French. Henry's approach to the problem was the Rough Wooing.

The most significant participants in the battle were the respective commanders, Somerset and Arran. Arran was Regent of Scotland and next in line to the Scottish throne after Mary Queen of Scots. He had been a Protestant and one of the negotiators of the original marriage agreement in 1543, but had converted to Catholicism and was pro-French. He had been one of the commanders of the Scottish army that had won the Battle of Ancrum Moor in 1545. In the aftermath of the Battle of Pinkie, he was instrumental in ensuring the escape of Mary to France, preventing the marriage from taking place. In 1554 Arran resigned the Regency to Mary of Guise, the mother of Mary Queen of Scots. Initially allied with her, he changed allegiance to the Protestant Lords of the Congregation and unsuccessfully opposed the decision to have the young queen married to the French Dauphin (later Francis II of France).

The Scottish vanguard was commanded by the Earl of Angus, the Red Douglas. Archibald Douglas, Earl of Angus, was one of the most powerful Scottish nobles of the sixteenth century. He first came to prominence on 6 August 1514 when he married Margaret, the Dowager Queen, widow of James IV, mother of James V and elder sister of Henry VIII of England. The marriage was instrumental in breaking the fragile peace in Scotland as Margaret's regency was to last until James V came of age or she re-married. She had been holding a delicate balance between the pro-French and pro-English factions at Court, but her marriage to Angus gave impetus to the pro-French group to push her out and install the Duke of Albany as regent. She eventually fled to England, leaving Angus in Scotland, where he promptly took a mistress and started spending Margaret's money. The ensuing enmity between the couple coloured Scottish politics for years to come. Angus was charged with high treason by the Duke of Albany, and was sent as a prisoner to France in 1522. He escaped to London in 1524 and then returned to Scotland with the support of Henry VIII. In 1524, Margaret made an alliance with the Earl of Arran and Angus had to take refuge in his ancestral home of Tantallon Castle. However, with the influence of Henry VIII from south of the border, Angus was able to force his way back into power and was appointed to the Council of Regency, which looked after the King in rotation despite Margaret's declaration in 1524 of his majority. Angus was the first of the council to have physical custody of the King, but refused to hand him over at the end of his three month period. He imposed himself as the Chancellor of Scotland, filled all positions of authority with Douglas family members and supporters and kept the young King effectively a prisoner. The Battles of Darnick and Linlithgow Bridge were both attempts to wrest control of the King from Angus. Despite his victory in both battles, Angus would only retain his control for another two years. James V escaped his custody in 1528 and began to rule on his own account, with his first order of business the removal of Angus, who had retreated to Tantallon again. Despite considerable effort on the part of James, Angus held out until 1529 when he was able to escape to England under a treaty between James and Henry VIII. Angus remained in England until James' death in 1542, at which point he returned on a mission from Henry to arrange a marriage between the infant Mary Queen of Scots and the future Edward VI. However, in 1544 he was in open conflict with the Earl of Arran, son of his ally in 1526, and imprisoned briefly. The English Rough Wooing (1543-1550), which attempted to coerce the Scots into accepting the marriage between Mary and Edward, hit Douglas lands hard and caused Angus to settle with Arran and the two fought together at the Scottish victory of Ancrum Moor and the defeat at Pinkie in 1547. He eventually died in 1557.

Also present within the Scottish army was George Gordon, the Earl of Huntly. He was Lord Chancellor of Scotland in succession to the murdered Cardinal Beaton. He was captured during the fighting at Pinkie, but was able to escape and head for France with Mary of Guise in 1550. He later turned against Mary Queen of Scots when she took the earldom of Moray from him, and later rose in rebellion against her. He died in captivity after being defeated in the Battle of Corrichie in 1562.

Edward Seymour was the Earl of Hertford, the Duke of Somerset and the Lord Protector of England during the minority of Edward VI. He was the brother of Jane Seymour, the third of Henry VIII's wives; she died from complications in childbirth, which was the reason that Somerset was able to survive the end of that marriage. He had been Warden of the Scottish Marches under Henry, and in this capacity had pursued the Rough Wooing vigorously on Henry's behalf. Somerset was also a leader of what was seen as the Reform group that led the Protestant cause in England. He was a talented military commander with a strong record of military victories; in addition to his successes in Scotland, he led the defence of Boulogne-sur-mer in 1546. However, he was less able as a politician and all of his schemes came to an unsuccessful end. He was not able to bring Scots to the English Protestant cause despite the growing strength of Protestantism in Scotland, and his policy of occupation proved to be an expensive failure because of supply difficulties. In 1549, he was stripped of the title of Lord Protector and was subsequently beheaded in 1552.

Lord William Grey led the English cavalry. He was an experienced soldier with distinguished service in the Italian War in France between 1544 and 1546. He was wounded by a pike thrust during the cavalry charge against the Scottish schiltrons, but survived to lead the establishment of the English base at Haddington, which was to be the focus of a prolonged siege. He survived the death of Somerset and involvement with Northumberland's attempt to put Lady Jane Grey on the throne. He was sent to France to defend the Calais enclave but was unsuccessful and ended with the loss of Calais and his own capture by the French. He was finally prominent in the Siege of Leith in 1560, when he led the English troops that participated in the attempts to drive the French out of Scotland, although his efforts here were generally seen as being a failure.

Lord John Dudley, Earl of Warwick, led the English vanguard at Pinkie. A confidant of both Henry VIII and Somerset, he was popular and considered one of the finest commanders in England. Warwick had been Lord Admiral of the Navy and provided naval support for military action during earlier phases of the Rough Wooing. At the time of Pinkie, he was once again a soldier. After Pinkie, Warwick was one of the most powerful of the nobles that ruled England during Edward VI's minority. He supported Somerset as Lord Protector, but as Somerset proved to be a less than able governor who was focused on expensive military policies, he led the efforts to remove Somerset from power. However, he ensured that no harm came to Somerset, although the latter was eventually executed on trumped up charges. Warwick became Duke of Northumberland and ran England for Edward VI, and led the attempt to have Lady Jane Grey succeed Edward in preference to the Catholic Mary. When this attempt failed, the Earl was charged with treason and beheaded in 1553 in front of a crowd of 10,000.

The battle itself is significant in terms of tactics. It was the first time in Britain that gunpowder weapons proved decisive in the outcome of a battle; it was also the first time that artillery, infantry, cavalry and naval support had combined in an action recognisable in modern terms. While, in these terms Pinkie was comparable to contemporary battles in Europe, the use of naval bombardment as part of the battle was a major innovation; the guns firing from the ships out at sea caused havoc amongst the Scottish rearguard and drove off some of the archers that might have replied to the English fire. Artillery had been present in earlier battles, such as Flodden in 1513, but had never been as effectively employed as it was at Pinkie. The English guns made the Scottish defensive position untenable, ripped great holes in the schiltrons and made it impossible for the Scots to hold position after fending off the cavalry. The standard English medieval tactics of archery and dismounted men-at-arms were replaced by heavy cavalry charging the enemy and pursuing them as they routed, with arquebuses firing into the sides of the schiltrons. As well as being the first time that such a battle had been fought on British soil, it was an early example of such tactics in European terms.

Context

The campaign of 1547 must be viewed not only as the descent of Anglo-Scottish political relations into war, but also in the context of Anglo-French relations and religious divisions within Scotland between Protestants and Catholics. This was the period of the Reformation, of John Knox and Cardinal Beaton, and the Scottish Protestants tended to look to England for support, the Scottish Catholics to France. This meant that the religious convulsions of the period were wrapped up in the abiding problem of the Auld Alliance.

One of Henry VIII's long term projects was to unite the kingdoms of England and Scotland, which he attempted to do through the marriage of the young queen Mary of Scotland and Prince Edward (later Edward VI) of England. This was partly because of the strategic issue of avoiding a war on two fronts, where the Scots would use the excuse of English military action in France to raid across the border. However, it was also because Henry VIII clearly did not accept the result of the Wars of Independence and believed that he had inherited Edward I's claim to the Scottish throne. In 1543, the English Parliament passed a subsidy act that described the late James V as 'the pretensed King of Scottes being but a usurper of the Crowne' and talked of Henry's 'right and title to the said Crowne and Realme'.

Some military confrontation was inevitable, as it was very clear from all of Henry's actions and words at the time that he intended Scotland to become a subject of England. While he was pressing for a marriage alliance between the young Mary and Edward, Henry had every intention of ruling Scotland as his own. It was unlikely that the Scottish nobility would accept this, although there were Protestant nobles who saw an opportunity for the advancement of both their personal ambitions and their faith in the match. Henry would never accept a rejection of his demands, and his response would inevitably be military. It was therefore to no one's surprise that the talks collapsed into open conflict in 1543-5 in the so-called Rough Wooing. The initial phases of this consisted of large scale raiding, where cattle were stolen and villages and towns destroyed, the inhabitants being slaughtered. In 1544, the Earl of Hertford led a large naval invasion of Scotland, taking Leith as a base to destroy the city of Edinburgh. His army devastated southern Scotland and set fire to Dunbar with heavy civilian casualties.

The raiding continued throughout 1544 and into 1545, until the Scots managed to inflict a defeat on an English army at the battle of Ancrum Moor in February. This reduced the number of raids, but in September, Hertford returned on another devastating raid. Again, the English caused tremendous damage, but got no further with forcing the acceptance of the marriage between Edward and Mary. The violence was halted partly by treaty in 1546, and partly by the death of Henry VIII on 28th January 1547. Edward now succeeded to the English throne as Edward VI, but as he was a minor, power was in the hands of the Earl of Hertford, who gained the title Duke of Somerset in February 1547. Somerset, who continued Henry's attempt to force the marriage of Edward to Mary, had concluded that Henry had failed by tactics solely built on terror; Somerset decided to add the control of territory to the terror. When the last two English strongholds north of the border were reduced by French naval intervention, Somerset's plans were not disturbed.

The English army was mustered at Berwick and from there, in early September, it crossed the border, marching north along the main east coast route, supported and supplied by the English fleet. At the same time, as a diversionary tactic, a smaller force of about 2,500 had been assembled at Carlisle, feigning a major west coast invasion. In response, the Earl of Arran mustered northern Scottish forces at Edinburgh and the troops from the south at Falla, about 15 miles to the south-east of the capital. From there he could respond to either a cross country or a coastal advance by the enemy. Once aware of the English route, Arran marched north to block their approach, where the coast road crossed the river Esk at Musselburgh, while the Scottish horse skirmished with Somerset's army as they advanced past Dunbar.

The landscape of the battlefield was recorded on a series of detailed plans of the phases of the battle which show both the topography of the battlefield and the armies on the move and help identify the location of events across the area.

The Scottish camp is generally shown to lie immediately west of the Esk in the area of Stonyhill; a contemporary English source gives its location as Edminston Edge, possibly the scarp immediately to the west of the Esk. The bridge to the east of the camp is the 'old bridge' on the map of 1824, a little upstream of the later bridges. The English camp the night before the battle lay on the coast adjacent to Prestonpans at Salt Preston two miles from the Scots. This is the approximate area of modern Drummohr and the Royal Musselburgh Golf Course.

The advance of the Scottish forces on the morning of 10 September was across the Esk by the old bridge on the main road west of Musselburgh and by fording the Esk immediately to the west of Inveresk church. The van and main battle then advanced on the south side and the rearguard on the north side of Inveresk church, then turning and marching south-east. The line of march of the English army was initially immediately west from their camp, perhaps broadly along the course of the later post road, which ran between Musselburgh and Inveresk to the old bridge. When the English saw that the Scots had already taken the high ground of Inveresk, they turned their march south-east towards Falside Hill.

Significant landscape features shown on the plans that indicate the locations of the troops are the slough (a low-lying area of soft waterlogged ground and standing water) immediately in front of the Scottish army and the lane that formed the western boundary of the Scottish deployment. The lane was used by Somerset to reconnoitre the Scottish camp and was where he intended to place his artillery to bombard their camp. The slough may refer to the stream running on the southern boundary dividing Inveresk fields from Carberry immediately west of Crookstone, while the lane may be the Carberry road.

The pursuit and slaughter began shortly beyond where the Scottish forces stood. From here, the Bodleian drawings makes clear the troops fled across the Esk, some south-west through marshland, others west through the Scottish camp, yet others via the Musselburgh bridge and along the coast. In the aftermath the small garrison of Scots located in Falside Castle were attacked by the English and the castle burnt to the ground.

The cavalry skirmish on 9 September was described by the main English source as being on Falside Brae, and this has had an effect in locating the battlefield. However, on the Bodleian drawings it appears to take place on the summit and north-east slope of Carberry Hill. This matches the source's description that recorded just one hill extending to the south-west with Carberry Tower at its foot; this might be explained if the source conflated the two hills into one. If this is the case, then it would push the main fighting further to the south and west than generally thought.

The battle was fought on the open ground to the east of Inveresk, around the Howe Mire. Overall, the general landscape of the battlefield and key features within it have been well preserved so that the events of the battle are still comprehensible. The majority of the main areas of fighting still lie within open fields, though the spread of Inveresk, Musselburgh and Wallyford and the A1 road has encroached on some potential areas of action. The routes of the English army from the lower slopes of Falside Hill and the Scots from Musselburgh and Inveresk to the battlefield can still be traced and understood, and significant landscape features, such as the lane illustrated on contemporary maps and Falside Castle, survive intact.

Important views, such as those looking out to sea from Inveresk Church (where the Scots must have seen the full extent of the English naval force) and from the slopes of Falside and Carberry Hill towards Musselburgh to the north-west, are intact and provide the same outlook as they would have done in the 16th century.

Location

The battle was known in the mid 16th century by a variety of names: Pinkie; Musselburgh (the English name for the battle); Inveresk; Seton; Falside Brae; Wallyford; and Pinkie Cleuch. These names encompass the battlefield on every side, but none enables exact location.

The Scottish camp was on the west of the Esk, but its exact position is difficult to determine. Patten gives its location as Edminston Edge, possibly the scarp immediately to the west of the Esk, and says it covered an area about 'a miles compass' (Patten 1548). The camp is generally shown to lie immediately west of the Esk in the area of Stonyhill. On the basis of a will signed at Monktounhall, the latter may have been Arran's headquarters.

The marsh, depicted in primary reports as protecting the camp on the south side, may have lain in the area of Shire Haugh; this might be an extensive area of alluvium in the loop of the river immediately south of Inveresk church, on the west side of the river, for there is no similar expanse of alluvium further upstream towards Dalkeith. The westernmost extent of the Scottish camp may have been significantly further west towards Newcraig.

The cavalry skirmish on the day before the battle, described by Patten as being on Falside Brae, appears from the Bodleian drawings to have taken place on the summit and north eastern slope of Carberry Hill, as the drawing shows bodies strewn across the slope. This is in accord with Patten's description, as he shows just one hill extending south westward with Carberry Tower lying at its foot, thus conflating the two hills into one. Also, when Somerset viewed the battlefield from the summit of Falside Hill, Patten states that the site of the cavalry skirmish was about half a mile to the south-east of them, broadly according with the slope of Carberry Hill. The pursuit of more than three miles that followed the skirmish was presumably in the general direction of Dalkeith and beyond.

As Patten records the English battle plan started with the deployment of artillery in the lane to the south of Inveresk to bombard the Scottish camp, a location which might suggest that the Scottish camp extended significantly further south than Stonyhill.

The advance of the Scottish forces on the morning of 10 September is shown on the Bodleian drawings: across the Esk by the old bridge on the main road west of Musselburgh, probably also by the ford which lies adjacent, and by fording the Esk immediately to the west of Inveresk church. The van and main battle then advanced on the south side and the rearguard on the north side of Inveresk church, then turning and marching south-east.

The line of march of the English army was initially immediately west from their camp, perhaps broadly along the course of the later post road. If Wallyford, already enclosed by c.1750, had been enclosed by 1547, then this will have influenced their march, but the army ultimately deployed at the foot of the hill.

The terrain features that enable the accurate placing of the Scottish deployments are the 'slough', which stood immediately in front of the Scottish army, and the lane lined on either side with a turf wall, which formed the western boundary of the Scottish deployment. The lane, described by Patten as being 30 ft wide and lined with turf walls about an ell high (1.14 m) on either side leading north to Inveresk church, was used by Somerset to reconnoitre the Scottish camp and was where he intended to place his artillery to bombard that camp.

Caldwell identifies the 'slough' as the stream running on the southern boundary dividing Inveresk fields from Carberry (Caldwell 1991), immediately west of Crookstone, while the lane lined with turf walls, is the Carberry road. The Bodleian drawings suggest that this is the case, with the orientation and the changes in direction of the lane, running towards the western slope of Carberry Hill and Carberry Tower. The boundary walls create a problem for this interpretation, however. There are few walls within Inveresk fields, according to Roy's map of c.1750. The best candidates are the boundaries of the walled parks depicted on the 1756 pre-enclosure map, the western one specifically said in 1756 to be bounded by a 'dyke'. On Roy, only the western road to Carberry is double walled, having a park on both sides at that date.

Placing the action on the Carberry boundary also puts it over a mile from the hill beside Inveresk, from which the Scottish heavy artillery is shown giving supporting fire during the action (Bannatyne engraving). Although it is as yet uncertain when enclosure took place, in c.1750 the area immediately south of the boundary and east of the Carberry road was already enclosed, as part of Dobson Mains. If it was already enclosed by 1547, then it could not have been the area across which the English army deployed. Most significantly, this location would place the English deployment in front of Carberry Hill when viewed from the Forth, the direction of the perspective drawings, yet they are very specific in placing the English army in front of Falside Hill, with Falside Castle behind them.

The distance between the depiction of the English army and the depiction of the Scots' location creates difficulties in marrying the contemporary illustrations, the accounts of the battle and the real terrain. However, the references to the hill may relate to the Forebrae, a lower terrace of Falside Hill with a very distinct slope facing north-westward towards Inveresk. This would place the English deployment in a suitably close proximity to the Scots, while accommodating the other details in the primary accounts. In addition to the lane with double walls to the west, the ridge and furrow depicted by Roy accords with the location and orientation of that described and depicted by Patten as a key terrain feature affecting the cavalry attack. The problem that this location poses, which the Carberry boundary site does not, is that the steep slopes of Falside Hill lie over half a mile away, unless the much lower slopes of the hill are meant in Patten's description of the English deployment. This provides a conflict of evidence that may only be ultimately resolved by archaeological investigation of the battlefield.

In order to place the two armies reasonably accurately within the landscape it is also important to estimate the likely frontages of each battle, given the documented troop numbers. However, there are problems in calculating the frontages of deployments as there were many formations in use in the 16th century. Though the pike would typically be deployed in the centre with a sleeve of shot (either arquebusier or archers) on either side, the detail and depth of deployment would depend upon the size of the battalions and the tactical requirements of the battlefield. Troops might be deployed in infantry squares of equal numbers of ranks and files or, if the tactical situation required, in double squares, or a perfect quadrilateral based on a ratio of 3 ranks to 7 files (Arnold 2001). In contrast, the space to be allocated to each man in battle formation is well known, being 3 ft (almost 1 m) per man in files and 6 ft (almost 2 m) in ranks. A crude calculation of frontages is given here based on a depth of deployment of 40 ranks, simply to give an order of scale for the frontages, yielding square infantry formations which is what all the contemporary depictions of the battle show. For the English forces, the frontage for the vanguard and rearguard would be 225 ft (70 m) and 300 ft (90 m) for the main battle, all 240 ft (75 m) deep. The cavalry have been shown deployed 20 deep in two divisions, one seconding the other, with 5 ft per horse in file and 10 ft in rank, giving 450 ft (140 m) frontage and 200 ft (60 m) depth. For the Scottish army, the battles probably had a frontage of 450 ft (140 m) each.

The pursuit and slaughter began shortly beyond where the Scottish forces stood. From here, the Bodleian drawing makes clear the troops fled across the Esk, some through marshland south-west, others west through the Scottish camp, yet others via the Musselburgh bridge and along the coast. No clear evidence has been forthcoming in terms of burials or other physical evidence to more accurately locate this flight.

Terrain

The historic terrain of the battlefield can be accurately reconstructed from detailed maps of the mid to late 18th century, which show the fields of Inveresk both before and immediately after enclosure. The late 18th century post-enclosure map also shows the more anciently enclosed fields of Pinkie, Wallyford and Musselburgh. Although these maps provide only the mid-18th century terrain, this is before many of the major changes resulting from enclosure in Inveresk fields. It may be possible through research on written sources to refine this evidence and trace features further back to the mid 16th century.

The pre-enclosure plan shows the pattern of open field furlongs in Inveresk fields, to which Roy's small scale mapping of circa 1750 provides crude detail of rig orientation. The pre-enclosure plan shows the early road pattern, and indicates the location of several enclosed parks. These are also seen from Roy's map, which identifies where walls, perhaps then still of turf, enclosed these and other areas.

The Roy map appears to distinguish arable from pasture areas in Inveresk Field and more widely, but this is not likely to be relevant to the 16th century land use pattern, whereas his distinction between the fields and moor is more likely to be relevant, as perhaps with the high ground on Falside Hill and Carberry Hill. Between the steep slopes of Falside Hill and the flat land towards Inveresk, there is a distinct intermediate slope and terrace of land which is described on the 1756 map as the Forebrae.

Condition

The undeveloped land on the western part of the area, around Inveresk Church and along the east bank of the Esk, is partly scheduled and partly within a Conservation Area. The National Trust for Scotland also owns a small area of gardens (open to the public) on the slopes of the Esk valley within Inveresk. The southern periphery of the battlefield is partly encompassed within the designed landscape of Carberry, as is the area to the south-west, associated with Dalkeith House, though neither may have seen any significant action. Another designed landscape lies on the northern side around Pinkie House, now encompassed by the built-up area of Musselburgh. A smaller scheduled area lies on Falside Hill. There is also an extensive area of SSSI (Site of Special Scientific Interest) on the coast close to the area of the English camp.

The majority of the battlefield appears to survive reasonably intact, as least as regards modern development. However, the railway was pushed through what may be the centre of the battlefield in the 19th century and the A1 dual carriageway through the southern area of the battlefield in the late 20th century, crossing the slope of the Forebrae, which might represent the location of the English battle array. The encroachment of urban development and mining on the northern edge of the battlefield is also of concern, especially as the exact location of the action remains uncertain. It is unclear how much, if any, of the core of the main action has been lost in this development. To the west, beside the Esk, the expansion of Inveresk village has certainly extended across the area of the rout, while to the west of the Esk the Scottish camp may have been partly if not wholly lost beneath the estates of Stoneyhill. Despite this, the vast majority of the battlefield remains as agricultural land at present and appears likely to have a high potential.

In the mid 19th century, large quantities of human bones, pieces of spears, swords, horseshoes and 'officers' epaulettes' were recovered on the eastern side of Howe Mire. Howe Mire also holds high potential for further remains, and may hold unusual remains, either as waterlogged deposits or as a buried land surface dating to the time of the battle.

To the south of Inveresk, in an area that would have been on the rout, the excavation of a cable trench in 1990 revealed the severely disturbed remains of at least two adult human skeletons. The site had been disturbed by earlier service trenches (NMRS NT37SE 92). No analysis was made of the remains and there was no indication of gender or date. As the battlefield lies in an area rich in prehistoric and later settlement, burial, military and other remains (Bishop 2002) and these disturbed remains were discovered in the near vicinity of cist burials (found in 1865), the skeletons may not relate to the battle at all..

A sewer pipeline was excavated through the battlefield in 2001, which revealed a mix of prehistoric and Roman material, but did not encounter any burials (NT37SE 50); unfortunately, the issue of the battle was not part of this fieldwork programme (Cook 2004).

As there was both a fire-fight around Falside Tower and then the burning of the tower itself, it is to be expected that both bullet scatters will exist in the land immediately surrounding the tower and that stratified deposits may exist from the burning itself. It is also possible that bullet impact scars could also exist on the stonework. The castle is now restored and occupied but still retains the original 15th century tower. The tower is now fully rendered so it is not possible to determine whether the structure retains shot impact scars from hagbutt or artillery fire during the siege.

Material relating to the battle has been recovered through numerous metal detecting surveys. These finds include lead balls, possible case shot, round shot, buttons, buckles and various pieces of horse fittings. A concentration of artefacts has been located to the south-east of Wallyford. A co-ordinated metal detector survey within the context of an archaeological research project will be required to determine if this area was the centre of the battle or one of the flanks.

Although there has been extensive development in parts of the battlefield, the area of the main battle has remained undisturbed and the potential for surviving in-situ evidence is high. Pinkie battlefield is of high importance not only because of the scale of the battle, but also because of the rarity of battlefields of this period in the UK. It has enormous potential to contribute to battlefield studies generally. There is an opportunity to recover evidence of artillery fire: case shot, comprising iron fragments or possibly lead bullets, probably used in the close quarter action; bullet scatters from the use of 'hagbutts'; and arrowheads, this being the only battle in Britain involving the intensive use of both archery and small arms fire. In this way Pinkie might provide a way of 'calibrating' the evidence of archery on earlier battlefields in Britain. It also has a high potential to contribute to our understanding of the nature of artefact scatters from Medieval battles. Other patterns of artefact deposition, of ferrous and non-ferrous artefacts, including those resulting from the stripping of the dead and from losses in the pursuit, should be present.

One of the English officers, William Patten, recorded that the bodies of the Scots were stripped before being disposed. This means that fastenings and other items of personal dress may have been strewn across the ground. As most of the Scottish infantry would have been wearing padded jackets with protective metal plates, the location of these may indicate the main area of the foot-soldiers.

One problem that must be taken into account is the possibility of superimposition of 17th century bullets, particularly from skirmishes in July and September 1650 when Scottish forces were engaged with Cromwell's army, 'upon a hill neer Musleborough' and in Musselburgh itself with a pursuit towards Edinburgh (Cromwelliana 1810, 86-7). However, this problem should be resolvable through detailed calibre analysis. It is also the case that metal detecting in 2004-6 revealed evidence of a Napoleonic era camp in the vicinity.

While some burial of combatants took place in Inveresk churchyard, the vast majority of those killed were probably buried in mass graves on the battlefield with others in a far more scattered fashion across the area of the pursuit, as far as Dalkeith, Edinburgh and Leith. The evidence of the pursuit is to be expected to extend with increasing scarcity almost as far as the Flodden Wall in Edinburgh.

According to Patten, the English camp on the night of 9 September was entrenched, meaning that there is a potential for archaeological features associated with the camp as well as artefact scatters. In contrast, the Scottish camp may yield extensive artefact scatters as it was subject to intensive plundering by the English troops. Unfortunately, there is a possibility that it lies entirely beneath the housing estate of Stoneybank.

The battle is also recorded in a series of contemporary plans which are the earliest and most extensive collection of surviving plans for any battle in Britain. These comprise detailed plans of the various phases of the battle, showing the armies on the move and the topography of the battlefield, and may indicate locations of potential finds related to the battle. They are currently held in the Bodleian Library.

There is a memorial stone which marks the supposed location of the English camp after the battle in parkland to the east of Inveresk church. There is also a battlefield memorial next to Salter's Road at the junction with the short slip road to Eskfield Cottages, and an annual commemorative ceremony is held here. Recent local interest has led to the formation of the Pinkie Cleugh Battlefield Group within the Musselburgh Conservation Society. There is no on-site interpretation but the Musselburgh Conservation Society has a guided battlefield walk on their website.

In Scotland, the battle is almost culturally invisible, particularly when compared to Bannockburn or Culloden. The only ballad that survives comes from England, called Musselboorowe Ffield, which survives as a fragment.

Commemoration & Interpretation

A small monument stands in Lewisvale Public Park, east of Inveresk church, to mark the supposed, but incorrect, site of the English camp on 9 September. The monument, at NT 3499 7216, is built into a stone wall. This is more likely to be in the English camp on the night after the battle instead.

Caldwell, D. H. 1991 'The Battle of Pinkie', in MacDougall, N. (ed.), Scotland and War, AD 79-1918. John Donald, Edinburgh. 61-94.

Crookshank, C. W. 1933 'A further note on the Battle of Pinkie', Archaeol J, 90 (1933), 18-25.

Oman, C. W. C. 1933 'The Battle of Pinkie, September 10, 1547. As represented in unpublished drawings in the Bodleian Library', Archaeol J, 90 (1933), 1-25.

Phillips, G. 1999 The Anglo-Scots Wars, 1513-1550: a military history. Boydell Press, Woodbridge.

Information on Sources & Publication

Patten wrote his account in 1548 and, though not a combatant, was present with the English army, close to the senior commanders and with access to Cecil's notes. It is the most comprehensive source, also including a series of three plans of the phases of the battle. The Harlean manuscript account, by the unnamed Englishman who was also probably present, though in places confusing the chronology of events, provides a good complement to Patten. Le Sieur de Berteville, a French Protestant, was also present with the English army and provided a rather confused account, though it is accompanied by an important graphic representation of the action. The French report, after 1549, in Latin, draws heavily upon Patten as do the various histories, such as that by Holinshed.

Lesser reports are still significant, especially that which draws upon the views of the Scottish commander, while the various 16th century historians add further sometimes independent detail or perspective. The surviving sequence of contemporary battle plans is the earliest and most extensive collection of surviving plans for any battle in Britain before the 18th century. A detailed interpretation of the action is provided by Caldwell in the form of 'block' plans, based mainly on the contemporary graphic representations. Phillips also provides a coherent account, referencing primary sources, though he does not provide a plan of the battle, and oddly he locates the later stages of the battle on Falside Hill itself.

Primary Sources

Berteville, le Sieur Récit de l'expedition en Écosse l'an 1546 (sic), et de la battayle de Muscleburgh ... au roy Edouard VI. (ed) D Constable, Bannatyne Club, 1825.

De expeditione in Scotiam commentarius, in Papiers d'ett, pieces et documents inedits ou peu connus raealtifs a l'histoire de l'Ecosse au XVIeme siecle, (ed) A Teulet, Bannatyne Club, 1852, I, 124-58. Original in Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris (C V Colbert 35); 16th or 17th century copy of original with corrections. French report in Latin written after 1549 which draws heavily upon Patten.

Patten, W 1548 'The Expedicion into Scotland of the Most Woorthely Fortunate Prince, Edward, Duke of Soomerset'. Reprinted in Willison, D & Constable, A Fragments of Scotish History Edinburgh, 1798. Also in Edward Arber, An English Garner, 3, 51-155, 1880.

'The Most Fortunate and Victorious procedinge of the godly, mightye, and valiant Prince, Edward, Duke of Somerset in Scotland, in the first yere of K.Edward the vi', British Library, Harleian MS 540, ff70-71.

Lesser reports

French Ambassador's report, giving the views of the Scottish commander Huntley. Correspondence politique de Odet de Selve', ed G Lefevre-Ponralis, Paris 1888, 203ff.

Imperial ambassador: Cal State Papers, Spanish, ix, 150-2. Dependent on Paget for information.

Assessments by various 16th century historians

Holinshed, R. (1587) The chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland, London (edited H. Ellis, 1808, 6 vols)

Buchanan, G. (1690) The history of Scotland, faithfully rendered into English, Churchill, London. ii, 364-68

Lindsay, R. (1728) The history of Scotland: from 21 February, 1436. to March, 1565 by Robert Lindesay of Pitscottie, To which is added a continuation, by another hand, till August 1604, Edinburgh. ii, 91-101

Knox, J. (1949) History of the Reformation in Scotland, Nelson, London; New York. I, 98-101

Leslie, J. (1885) The Historie of Scotland, wrytten first in Latin by. John Leslie. ii, 296-301.

Cartographic & Illustrative Sources

British Library

'The Englishe victore agaynste the Schottes by Muskelbroghe 1547' : undated print but according to the catalogue probably produced soon after the battle, and before the subsequent English defeat in 1549. It may be another copy of that in the National Army Museum (not seen). Published in Baynton-Williams, A & M 2007 Maps of War. London. 8-9

Bodleian Library

Set of 5 manuscript plans of battle phases. Published in Oman, Archeaol J, xc, 1933, 1-25

National Army Museum

Print, probably same as (1) above. Source was possibly the Bodleian plans, but compressed into one image. Thus of limited value. Published in Oman, Archaeol J, xc, 1933, 1-25; Also J of Society for Army History Research, 12, 1933, 102-3.

Published Source

3 plans in W. Patten, The Englishe victore agaynste the Schottes by Muskelbroghe 1547. London: 1547. Redrawn in Edward Arber, An English Garner, vol.3, p.113-117, but this is not adequate as some detail lost. Copy in NLS Ry.11.h.15.

Other Cartographic Sources

Pinkie and Inveresk Fields, 1778, NAS RHP24995.

Plan of ground at Magdalene Bridge, Inveresk, 1809 NLS Acc11408

Printed plan of the Fields of Inveresk, 1756, NLS MS.5114.no.4; Original printed copy. Identical document is in NAS.

Plan of Musselburgh and its environs, 1824, NLS Signet.s.116.

Plan of the lands called the Fields of Inveresk, showing seams of coal, 1763, NAS RHP3562

Plan of ground betwixt His Grace the Duke of Buccleuch's and Sir Robert Dickson's, Inveresk, c.1770, NAS RHP9596

Plan of Pinkie Mains and adjacent farms, 1790, NAS RHP82669

Plans of part of 2 roads leading south from Inveresk to Carberry and Falside, 1763, NAS RHP94020-94021 (RHP94021 a copy, slight variations)

Secondary Sources

Arnold, T. F. 2001 Renaissance at war. Cassell, London.

Blackmore, H. L. 1976 The Armouries of the Tower of London: The Ordnance. HMSO, London.

Caldwell, D. H. 1991 'The Battle of Pinkie', in MacDougall, N. (ed.), Scotland and War, AD 79-1918. John Donald, Edinburgh. 61-94.

Cook, M 2004 'Howe Mire: excavations across the cropmark complex at Inveresk, Musselburgh', Proc Soc Antiq Scot, 134 (2004), 131-160.

Crookshank, C. W. 1933 'A further note on the Battle of Pinkie', Archaeol J, 90 (1933), 18-25.

Ellis, C 2002 'Stadium site, Wallyford, East Lothian (Inveresk parish), evaluation', Discov Excav Scot, 3 (2002), 40.

Fergusson, S. J. 1963 The White Hind and Other Discoveries. Faber and Faber, London.

Fraser, G. M. 1974 The Steel Bonnets: The story of the Anglo-Scottish Border Reivers. Pan, London.

Jordan, W. K. 1968 Edward VI, the young king. Allen & Unwin, London.

Leslie, J. 1885 The Historie of Scotland, wrytten first in Latin by John Leslie, Bishop of Rosse, and translated in Scottish by Father James Dalrymple.

Oman, C. W. C. 1933 'The Battle of Pinkie, September 10, 1547. As represented in unpublished drawings in the Bodleian Library' Archaeol J, 90 (1933), 1-25.

Paterson, R. C. 1997 My Wound is Deep: A history of the later Anglo-Scots Wars, 1380-1560. John Donald, Edinburgh.

Phillips, G. 1998 'In the Shadow of Flodden: Tactics, Technology and Scottish Military Effectiveness, 1513-1550', Scott Hist Rev, 77 (1998), 162-82.

Phillips, G. 1999 The Anglo-Scots wars, 1513-1550: a military history. Boydell Press, Woodbridge.

Reid, S. 2004 Battles of the Scottish Lowlands, Battlefield Britain. Pen & Sword, Barnsley. 2004.

Roberts, J. L. 1999 Feuds, Forays and Rebellions: History of the Highland Clans 1475-1625. : Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.

Sadler, J. 1996 Scottish Battles: From Mons Graupius to Culloden. Canongate, Edinburgh.

Seymour, W. 1979 Battles in Britain and their Political Background 1066-1746. : Book Club Associates, London.

Smurthwaite, D. 1993 The Complete Guide to the Battlefields of Britain. Michael Joseph, London.

Warner, P. 1995 Famous Scottish Battles. Cooper, London.

Wilkie, J. 1919 Historic Musselburgh. Blackwood, Edinburgh.

Willison, D. & Constable, A. 1798 Fragments of Scotish [sic] history. printed by David Willison for Archibald Constable, Edinburgh.

Young, P. & Adair, J. 1979 From Hastings to Culloden : battlefields in Britain. : Roundwood Press, Kinetoun.